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FROM RUPTURES TO ERUPTION: 
A GENEALOGY OF THE DECEMBER 2008 REVOLT IN GREECE 
Christos Giovanopoulos &  
Dimitris Dalakoglou 
In mid-December 2008, a teacher from Athens narrated the following 
incident: a few days before, her nine-year-old son had come home from 
school and asked her if she knew how to make a Molotov cocktail. The 
woman was surprised, but wanted to tease him so she asked him if he 
knew how. The boy replied that he did and started describing the process 
with confidence: 
“You take a bottle of beer,” the boy explained.  
“Why not a bottle for orange juice?” his mother asked.  
“No, no! It must be a bottle of beer; you drink the beer first 
and then fill the bottle with petrol, you put a piece of cloth on the top 
and you light up the cloth and throw it.” 
Although some readers may be surprised to hear of a nineyear-
old kid accurately describing how to make a petrol bomb, the fact is that 
this story is indicative of the diffusion of political images and 
imagination across entire generations, including the very young, in 
recent Greek history. Many of the kids who familiarised themselves with 
these radical discourses and imaginations sooner or later helped to form 
or participated actively in the recent political movements in the country. 
Three high school and university students’ movements in the last twenty 
years (1990–1991, 1998–2000, 2006–2007) confirm this radicalization 
of teenagers and people in their early twenties. Further  91 
more, the December 2008 events comprise a further confirmation, as 
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students—who saw their peer being shot—made up the main body of the 
revolt. 
There are various ways that one can conceptualize the social 
activism of young people in Greece today. For example, one could argue 
that it reflects the level of politicization of the rest of society. This is a 
politicization that is linked with recent history: the civil war (1946–1949) 
of two generations ago was followed by several decades of police-state 
oppression and pogroms against the defeated left, and of course there was 
the military junta (1967–1974), all of which have left a mark on the 
personal and family histories of most people in Greece. However, despite 
the historical continuities that we should take into account, we have to 
state clearly that the radicalization of the youth during the post-dictatorial 
period is very particular and takes on a different character in the post-
1990s period. Although this period signifies the longest-lasting 
parliamentary regime in Greek history, there has also been a large 
concentration of social movements, coinciding with the introduction of 
neoliberalism in the country. 
In this article we hope to demonstrate that this “restored” Greek 
parliamentary democracy could not afford to allow acts of disobedience 
or protest against its own ills and the ills which it inherited. The line of 
argument they have used against the young protesters is that those who 
have revolted and protested against the supposedly democratic state do 
not have the right to do so as they have no legitimate reason for protest. 
Especially the youth has been represented and criticized as the “lucky 
generation,” living in a free society, in a “Europeanised” and fully mod -
ernised polity with social provisions, etc. Furthermore, according to some 
public commentators, the youth of the post-dictatorial period is the first 
generation to live in affluence in comparison to their parents’ 
generation. This discourse was very popular amongst the reactionary 
journalists and academics in December 2008. They emphasised that 
Alexis was a private school kid, coming from relatively wealthy, middle-
class parents.
1
 This argument about wealthy kids revolting for fun has 
been used repeatedly against the youth who have chosen a radical and 
often violent way of resisting the authorities. Without fetishising the 
lower economic classes, one should notice that actually not  a word was 
spoken about those kids who spread the rebellion to the poor, working-
class suburbs of Athens and throughout Greece’s rural, small, and oth -
erwise quiet towns. Neither did we hear about the great number of young 
migrants or second-generation immigrants who also participated 92 in 
December in large numbers. This meeting of youth from various paths of 
life in the streets in December 2008 did not come out of the 
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blue. Since the end of the dictatorship and especially since the beginning 
of the 1990s in Greece a lot of young people identify with far-left and 
anarchist agendas regardless of their class or wider social origin, not least 
because the youth have been constantly the primary target by various 
neoliberal measures and oppressive state campaigns. 
The reader has to bear in mind that our argument throughout this 
paper is that there exist several distinctions applied to the people involved 
in the post-dictatorial movements. The main distinction we will draw is 
between the more fixed political subjectivities of the preneoliberalism 
period (up to circa 1990–1993) and the people who were raised or even 
born after the establishment of neoliberal (called modernization) policies 
in Greece. Our purpose is to outline the momentous genealogies of the 
December 2008 revolt in Greece and show the gradual emergence of a 
new social agency, political subjectivities and political tactics that 
contributed to the unmaking from below of the political context of 
metapolitefsi (the post-dictatorial period, see Glossary). In that respect we 
focus on the “breaking continuities” (or, continuous breaks) that led to the 
December eruption, which we consider to have been a radical break with 
metapolitefsi’s political structures. So our article aims to talk both about 
the political genealogy and the political formation of the actual genea 
(generation) of December’s revolt. 
The empirical historical part of this chapter cannot be exhaustive, 
as there have been many more movements in Greece than we could 
include in this text. Instead, we will focus on five moments of mass 
militant student and youth movements (1979–80, 1987–88, 1990– 91, 
1998–99, 2006–07) that moved beyond the established margins and 
challenged the dominant political configurations in each of these peri-
ods. Moreover, we will underline three critical moments (1985, 1990, 
1995) as in-between instances where the intervention of youth outside of 
the mainstream politics was felt strongly. 
THE 1979–1980 OCCUPATION MOVEMENT: THE FIRST BLOW 
In 1979–1980 Greece saw the formation of a mass student movement that 
was led by the extra-parliamentarian left, mainly its Marxist-Leninist 
contingent. This movement forced the prime minister at the time, 
Karamanlis (senior), to announce in his national address on New Year’s 
Eve the cancellation of the notorious 815 legal act, which pertained to 
educational reform. This movement formulated a militant political 
culture by actively challenging the political consensus of the “newly 93 
reborn” democracy of the early post-dictatorial period. The movement 
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was also linked to the appearance of a new extra-university youth that 
referenced the autonomous and antiauthoritarian ideologies and met and 
mingled with the students in the occupied universities. This meeting 
occurred at a moment when the people’s demand for real change and an 
end to the—still ongoing at the time—right-wing post-civil-war police 
state was gathering momentum. During this period, and largely thanks to 
the occupation movement, the structural weakness of the conservative 
government of New Democracy—albeit its clear parliamentary majority—
became apparent. 
Despite the apparent weaknesses of the regime, there were 
efforts by the institutionalised and newly-legalised mainstream left to 
control the youth movement and support the established order. For 
example, the socialist- and communist-youth-controlled National Stu-
dents’ Union of Greece (EFEE) decided to close all universities just 
before Christmas in 1979 in order to diffuse the movement’s dynamic 
that had developed outside the union’s control. Arguably, amongst the 
crucial political contributions of the 1979–1980 protests was that they 
exposed the role of the communist youth (KNE)—the strongest student 
organisation at the time—in applying the political pact of metapolitefsi. 
KNE not only condemned the occupations but its members tried to re-
occupy the Chemistry School of Athens, which was already occupied by 
the students’ assembly, in order to regain order. For this action they 
received the congratulations of the conservative minister of Internal 
Security. In fact, through the KNE the government could bypass the 
obstacle that the academic asylum (see Glossary) imposed on the inter-
vention of the police. On the other hand, the occupation movement 
functioned as the next reference point in the line of students’ upheavals 
since the anti-junta revolt of 17 November 1973. In wider terms, it 
expressed the surfacing social and political changes from below in the 
post-dictatorship era. 
Nevertheless, despite the 1979–1980 movement’s attempts to 
define and intervene in the processes of social transformations, it was not 
able to substantiate an alternative route. It seemed that it reached the peak 
of its potential on 17 November 1980 when the radical part of the 
movement attempted to break the ban on marching towards the US 
embassy that the conservative government had imposed on the 
commemorating demonstration for the anti-junta revolt.
2
 The break of the 
ban led to head-to-head clashes with the police outside the Greek 
parliament and the death of two militants: Stamatina Kanelopoulou, 
94 a worker, and Iakovos Koumis, a student. While the 1979–1980 move-  
ment challenged the strict limits of the post-dictatorial democracy and 
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exposed the demand for an end to the post-civil-war regime and for political 
change, what followed was characterised by a lack of strategy or the ability 
to take any further initiative. These changes culminated the next year in the 
victory for the first time in Greece of what was considered at the time to 
be a left party, PASOK: the populist social-democrats of Andreas 
Papandreou. Also faced with a dubious stance toward PASOK’s left 
rhetoric (a year later), the movement suffered the dissolution of its most 
significant and large Marxist-Leninist organisations. 
1981–1989: CHALLENGING THE “SOCIALIST” VERSION OF DEMOCRACY 
After PASOK’s domination for a number of years and despite the fact 
that a large number of activists remained active in higher education and 
at a local and social levels, the framework had changed. Although the 
political system of metapolitefsi was still intact, and more stable than 
ever, it was disguised in its most democratic gowns. Under this new 
condition a generation emerged, characterised by an anti-authoritarian 
sentiment, that challenged PASOK’s hegemony and democratic cred-
ibility. It was a new breed that responded to the institutionalisation of the 
so-called Polytechnic Generation (see Glossary) and the November 
1973 revolt. It was a youth critical of PASOK’s modernisation and to the 
traditionalism and compliant integration of the left and the trade unions
3
 
whose ineffective forms of struggle were actively refused. 
The disillusionment and the numbness that affected the ma jority 
of the radical left after PASOK’s first season in government, was 
interrupted in 1985 by violent protests and the occupations of the 
Chemistry School and the Polytechnic after the murder of the fifteen-
year-old school student Michalis Kaltezas by the police. Kaltezas was 
shot by a riot cop named Melistas during clashes with the police in the 
neighbourhood of Exarcheia on the anniversary of the revolt of 17 
November. The events were a culmination of numerous moments of 
intervention by the far left and the anarchist movement in the previous 
period, which were characterised in practice by violent clashes with the 
police: university occupations (e.g. of the Chemistry School occupation 
prior the general elections of 1984), the attack on and cancellation of a 
neo-Nazi meeting with Le Pen
4
 in Caravel Hotel in Athens (1984) or the 
conflicts for “territorial control” (i.e. resistance against the gentrifi -
cation of the highly politicised Exarcheia square). Arguably, in this yet 
organisationally infant political culture, it was rather the subcultural 
urban identity politics that prevailed, interwoven with the phantom of 95 
a militant tradition and a prevailing antiauthoritarian sentiment. The 
REVOLT AND CRISIS IN GREECE 
events of these years mark the first autonomous appearance of the an-
archist/anti-authoritarian movement trying to establish a culture of direct 
action based largely on an anti-state and anti-police agenda. The 
intervention of this “angry youth” (as it was labelled at the time) signified 
an end to the golden years of PASOK. However it failed—or rather did 
not attempt at all—to create or connect with larger struggles, which to a 
large degree it despised. It was also during this time that the “annual 
rendezvous” with the police each 17 November was established. Thus, 
against the co-optation of the November revolt and the consumption of its 
ideals in the electoral terrain, one meets the mutation of the revolt to its 
simulacra, a formal repetition of the signs of revolt which created its own 
referential reality and political imagination that reached its limit in, or 
immediately after, December 2008. Nevertheless, the de-marginalisation 
of practices—such as school occupations—and their expansion outside 
the universities (or rather the gradual shift of the main subject of the 
youth movement from the politicised and organised university students to 
the more contingently mobilized school kids) marked another important 
difference of the period. 
However, these events functioned as semiological and historical 
preludes to larger developments that the youth were at the front-lines of. 
The most significant phenomenon was the beginning of the de-
alignment of notable parts of the Greek society from the political parties. 
Within the rigid polarisation of the post-WWII and the early metapolitefsi 
era, the struggles of those who were rejected by the state or prevented 
access to the goods of modernisation and democracy (e.g. the defeated of 
the civil war) coincided with the anti-right sentiment of political 
struggles, parties, and institutions. The memories were still very fresh and 
the political alignments were quite polarized on either side, that of the 
state and that of the popular resistance. Hence such polarity expressed an 
abstract and ideological subjectivity which was directly linked to the 
concrete conditions of people’s everyday lives. Therefore the distinction 
between the social and the political was very difficult to make for 
several decades after the end of the civil war. This changed with the 
victory of PASOK in 1981; the coming of PASOK to power was 
portrayed as the reconciliation of the civil war and as a reunification of 
the Greek society. Nevertheless, these politics of the so-called 
“national reconciliation” during the 1980s signified a process of 
consolidation that removed the basis on which previously socio-political 
subjectivities and affiliations were based on. 
96  Thus the integration of the previous outcasts into the politi-  
cal establishment created considerable gaps, but not yet a vacuum. To 
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be fair, the right/anti-right dichotomy was still active and long-lasting 
(manifesting itself indirectly even in the December 2008 revolt) and 
formulated the dominant bipartisan system (PASOK-ND) in the 
exchange of power. However, another mass youth movement of the 
1980s, signified by a new round of university and school occupations 
in 1986–1988, marked the emergence of the so-called “party of the dis-
content,” namely a youth with only loose reference to the previous po-
litically-based identities. The mobilisation of this youth was motivated 
by its own experience, namely the eye-witnessing of the collapse of po-
litical difference between PASOK and ND in power, in their policies, 
discourses, and practices. A collapse those previous generations refused 
or could not apprehend, as the older generations still referred to those 
two poles in terms of imagined or actual differences. The collective and 
individual subjectivation of the 1980s movements was founded on this 
collapse and manifested itself with the spread of the action of oc-
cupation. Until that moment the occupation of public buildings, even 
universities and schools, was considered an act almost outside the limits 
of law (for the most conservatives it was an outwardly terrorist act), and 
certainly outside the “pact of metapolitefsi,” which laid out the agreed-
upon borders of social confrontation. The efficiency of the 1979–
1980 occupations, which managed the cancellation of an already-passed 
law by occupying just four university departments, underlined the real 
and symbolic power of this form of struggle. The people involved in the 
1986–88 movement, however, created different constituencies and an 
agency that was characterised by two new elements. The first was the 
prevalence of their everyday social needs (as basis for their subjectivity 
and actions) and not of their ideological position. This had as a con-
sequence the second: a distancing from, and critique of, party-based 
youth politics. They had a critique expanded beyond the two poles 
(PASOK and ND) and encompassed the rest of the parties, including 
those of the left (KKE and KKE) who had dominated the “politicisation” 
of the Greek youth. The spread of the act of occupations in secondary 
and higher education, for first time in the majority of the main cities 
in the country, exemplified the retreat of the party-youth control of the 
movement. 
This loosening of party affiliation and social background ex -
pressed within the universities was combined with the structural chang-
es of both higher education and of Greek society broadly. The expansion 
of higher education in the post-1981 era brought changes to the 
demographics of university students that also affected the politics of 97 
the students’ movement. Larger portions of students with working-class 
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origins did not translate automatically in stronger working-class-
orientated student politics. On the contrary, at the level of student 
elections the results gradually converged with those of the general 
elections. This meant a retreat of the dominant communist youth 
representation that won the student elections until 1986, and the 
ascent of the student group of the conservative-party-affiliated 
DAP, fuelled by the ideal of upward social mobility and the 
promotion of the neoliberal yuppie dream. 
In this context, the non-party affiliated student formations of 
the radical left provided to the movement the organisational know-how 
and a political framework and analysis. The latter though was somewhat 
distant for the majority of students. This was obvious due to the fact that, 
despite the rise of radical left activists and better results in the student 
elections after each occupation movement, the radical left groups failed to 
formulate a political subject or force, or to extend their hegemony at a 
social level. More importantly, this gap was obvious in the relationship 
between forms of activism and content. The more radical the former 
became, the less the latter, which was increasingly restricted to specific 
demands regarding education and provided less of an overall critique of 
the capitalist system. However, the spread of such radical practices of 
political contestation underlined deeper changes in Greek society, as the 
1990s will show, with the main characteristic being the increased 
discrepancy between political institutions and social agency. 
1990s: REFORMING METAPOLITEFSI AND CONTESTING  
NEOLIBERALISM 
Structurally, the 1989–1990 period can be considered a transitional period 
in the reconfiguration of the dominant discourses and political 
establishment in Greece. This occurred as both the result of larger 
changes in world geopolitics (the collapse of the Soviet block) and of the 
antagonisms in struggles for internal domination between the emerging 
neo-bourgeois sectors (expressed by PASOK) and the traditional ones 
(ND). This antagonism created a climate of violent interventions between 
competing economic groups and extrapolitical institutions (e.g. media 
corporations) through the eclectic disclosure of scandals in an effort to 
remake the social contract and political map of metapolitefsi. The “end of 
metapolitefsi” has become a permanent slogan since then. In reality, what 
was introduced by the three governments 
98 of the 1989–1993 period was an openly neoliberal restructuring of the  
Greek economy and society, which needed to disintegrate those social 
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obstacles for the “modernization”—the second dominant slogan—of the 
country. These obstacles included the social and public services of a 
poorly-developed welfare state, employment rights, sovereign policy for 
economic development, and any organized, antagonistic social agency, 
such as trade unions. 
This neoliberal offence was implemented by the conservative 
government of K. Mitsotakis (1990–1993). This wouldn’t, however, have 
been able to occur without the consensus of the rest of the parliamentarian 
parties at the time. Indeed, the Mitsotakis’s administration governed with a 
very thin parliamentary majority. He secured this through the tolerance of 
all the oppositional parties (from its arch-rival PASOK to the unified 
Coalition of the Left—SYNaspismos, namely the unified KKE and 
KKE) and their consensus for this “catharsis.” The slogan, literary 
meaning a “clearing” of the scandals,
5
 in reality regarded the direction of 
the reforms and each party’s position in the frame of a reformed 
metapolitefsi. The collapse of PASOK’s government (1989) under the 
weight of scandals and corruption led to two elections without any party 
gaining a majority. Thus after the first elections of 1989 a coalition 
government combining the right wing ND and the two unified 
communist parties (Synaspismos) was formed. While the latter was 
hoping that its participation would deepen the PASOK’s crisis and 
eventually marginalise the social democratic party, it was considered to be 
a betrayal of the whole post-WWII struggles against the police state of the 
right.
6
 Thus, instead, the result in the new elections two months later was 
that PASOK gained the lost ground and participated in a new “ecumeni-
cal” (national) government, which included all the parliamentary elected 
parties: PASOK, ND, and the unified Synaspismos. 
1990–1991: MASS SCHOOL OCCUPATIONS 
It was in this context that the 1990–1991 occupation movement emerged. 
It was preceded though, by the January 1990 monthly occupation of the 
Polytechnic. The Polytechnic was occupied by anarchists because 
Melistas—the cop who killed fifteen-year-old Michalis Kaltezas back 
in 1985—had just been cleared of all charges in his second trial. Although 
anarchists and anti-authoritarians initiated this occupation, it was 
supported by the decisions of the students’ assemblies of the different 
departments of the Polytechnic and it was also reinforced by student 
occupations of other universities for a shorter period (1–2 weeks). This 
occupation, remembered as “the blossom of the Greek 99 
youth” (named after the proverbial slogan on the banner of the last  
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demo), marks a qualitative difference within the anti-authoritarian 
movement and the anti-organisational anarchism of the 1980s, mainly due 
to the prominent role of the Athens squatters’ movement. Despite being a 
relatively small group, the anarcho-punk squatters’ organisational skills—
gained from their DIY experience—were transferred into the running of 
the occupation. This meant not only a position against the destruction of 
buildings and university facilities, but also control at the gates, the setting 
up of a collective canteen, cleaning shifts, etc. This new spirit, along with 
the organised communication (mainly by way of leafleting and flyer-
posting) to the schools outside the centre of Athens, allowed the 
occupation to last for a month and to gain a mass support. One could say 
that indeed the January occupation left some footprints that led to the 
school occupation movement that erupted in November of the same year 
and lasted almost three months. 
The 1990–1991 movement was the biggest—almost univer-
sal—school occupation movement in the history of the country, involv-
ing hundreds of thousands of students and several thousand schools and 
higher education institutes. In fact, it was eclipsed only by the uprising 
of December 2008 as one of the most significant moments in the 
history of social antagonism and political contestation in the post-
dictatorship era. In addition to its mass character, the 1990–1991 
movement was distinguished by strong qualitative differences from 
previous ones and defines the entrance into a new era of antagonistic 
politics in Greece. 
Demographically, this movement was made up of those who belonged to 
a generation of people who were born or grew up after the dictatorship 
and entered their teens under the PASOK government. This means that 
they had been severed from the first-hand memory of the radicalisation 
of the metapolitefsi years and its political culture, if not of the 
(institutionalised by now) 1973 Polytechnic revolt, too. While the 
political representation of the uprising consisted of university students—
largely due to their ability to politically articulate the movement’s 
positions, their experience, and their national networks— the real 
backbone of the movement consisted of secondary school students. The 
massive participation of schools and universities, reaching around 90%, 
meant that for the very first time every town in Greece had a secondary 
education school occupied. This invasion of school students in the 
forefront of social contestation meant that the political subject (not of 
one or the another party, but as such itself) was left to 100 the social 
agency of those making the movement. Organised political groups were 
forced to follow the initiative of the youth, which in real - 
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ity set the agenda and exercised the real hegemony in the movement. 
Therefore the attempts to politicise the movement with larger aims and 
goals, or even analyses and perspective, failed. In the previously de-
scribed atmosphere of disillusionment and de-alignment from political 
parties, the youth did not share much with the pre-1990s experience and 
posed its own kind of politics and culture of protest. Its political logic 
was unique; on the one hand it had the potential to revitalise those “old” 
and “stereotyped” methods, while on the other hand it asked for 
something different. In short, this first instance of the prevalence of 
social agency and rather unplanned responses (which were, however, not 
spontaneous despite being strongly intuitive), in comparison with the 
political subjects already active in the movement, provided a glimpse 
into the shifts that would emerge during the following years and expand 
beyond the educational sector. This movement also holds strong paral-
lels with the December revolt regarding the relation between the “po-
litical” and the “social” subject, and regarding either what was called the 
“spontaneity” of the movement or its lack of concrete demands and 
political procedures of decision making. 
Politically, the lack of any alternative within the system, either 
nationally due to the ecumenical government, or internationally due to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world, was spotted 
clearly within this mass movement. Going beyond the wider ac-
knowledgement that “everyone is the same”—a sameness materialized 
very tangibly by the coalition and the ecumenical governments—this 
movement tried to constitute its antithesis to the political system by the 
slogan: “when you [the mainstream parties] agree in the parliament, the 
only opposition is us.” In that way, it reworked and subverted the 
promoted and dominant, at the time, anti-populist and anti-political 
discourse that propagated the need of technocrats and specialists to be at 
the helm rather than politicians. A discourse (of ignoring the political 
cost) that aimed at the marginalisation of the energetic politically Greek 
populace. 
In this context, the 1990–1991 occupation movement managed to 
reconfigure the promoted system of political indifference amongst all 
the parliamentary parties and turn it into a condemnation of the politi cal 
system as a whole. They did this by drawing and emphasizing an explicit 
line between the strategically-unified political personnel and the people 
who had taken over the streets and the education institutions. The 
workers’ and teachers’ struggles in the following years (1991–1993) 
against the de-industrialisation of the country and the privatisation of 101 
the public services in one sense resisted and derailed the neoliberal ref- 
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ormation of metapolitefsi. As result it deepened the internal contradictions 
of the political establishment, contradictions that were based on a 
developed clientèle system that absorbed social discontent and maintained 
electoral power. However, the contraction of the state apparatus and the 
deregulation of the working market shrunk this system’s abilities to 
provide favours. This contradiction was given a radical form by the current 
IMF intervention that has exposed and shaken the political system in 
Greece to its foundations. 
The contribution of the 1990–1991 movement to the legiti-
misation of a series of political practices was immense. Most notably, 
the perception of building occupations and road blockades as marginal 
behaviour used mainly by extreme revolutionary political groups was 
radically altered as a result of the movement. At the same time, the dis-
solution of the Youth of the Communist Party (KNE)
7
 allowed space for 
more immediate, or rather unmediated, expressions of social anger and 
more radical and inventive forms of resistance to emerge. One could 
suggest that the characteristics of the 1990–1991 movement, as they 
appeared in its slogans, actions, and organization, were more in sync 
with the movements of the French youth in 1986 and of the Italian 
students of the “panther” movement in 1990 than with the hitherto 
political culture of the radical students of Greece. 
In that sense, the entry of a new generation, without the political 
links of the previous one, refreshed the logic and the vocabulary of 
political protest in Greece but at the same time was lacking the ability to 
articulate concrete demands or perspective. Namely, its demands were 
mainly defensive. This was not a new feature, only now it had become 
the dominant one. Due to the lack of any alternative proposal, the 
demands were very specific and were articulated against the most 
obviously reactionary elements of the proposed “white paper” for edu-
cation. So the movement’s most popular demands were a refusal: to pay 
for their textbooks, to return to the regime of school uniforms, to cut the 
days of school holidays, and to decrease the ceiling of the allowed 
absences from school. Their limited aims were directed against the 
economic consequences and the disciplinary functioning of the edu-
cational system. Nevertheless, larger demands or platforms connecting 
such consequences with the deeper restructuring of education failed to be 
embraced or prevail. But the unity and strength, both in numbers and 
morale, that these specific aims gathered showed the ability of the 
movement to expand, endure, and eventually succeed. 
102  A second distinct element was the lack of the confrontation-  
al character that past youth movements had applied, a logic of force 
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that was exercised not only against the system but also for acquiring 
power within the movement. This does not mean that the 1990–1991 
movement renounced or did not use force or violence, but rather that it 
did so as a last resort. Confrontation was not prioritized in its political 
practice. Instead, argumentation, inventiveness, ridicule, humour, and 
collective participation were the main attitudes of the movement and 
these things encompassed even its violent moments. And yet, the dis-
ruption that this movement caused was much greater than any other 
until then—both in terms of time and space. However, blocking the 
roads with their school desks in order to inform the public of their de-
mands and creating “functional occupations”—namely staying in their 
schools and creating their own spaces that they cared for, cleaned up, 
and maintained—were tactics clearly distinct from the destroying of 
systemic symbols. Such tactics of spatial reclaiming proved so effective 
that the usual rhetoric of vandalism was unable to break the public 
support for the movement, to allow the success of legal or more radical 
anti-occupation actions organised by authorities and vigilante groups, or 
to unease and mobilise parents against their kids. 
The political practice that this movement produced manifested a 
different set of ethics, subjectivity, and agency that, retrospectively, one 
could argue had more in common with the ethics of the first days of the 
anti-globalisation movement—ten years later—than with the previous 
experiences of youth mobilisation in Greece. Its non-violent, or rather, 
non-destructive attitude was manifested even in its slogans, which gave 
it an integrity that was instrumental for its endurance and final success. 
One must also underline the determination of this movement to resist all 
attacks by the government and the state. Integrity and determination 
were fundamental elements for the maintenance of its mass character 
and support, as well as its unprecedented endurance— expressed with 
the slogan “I endure”—that kept the schools open and occupied during 
the Christmas break. It was also effective in resisting the government’s 
attacks on the refusal of the movement to negotiate with it, and in 
mobilising masses broader than the youth. 
Then at the beginning of January 1991, three days and nights of 
clashes with the police in the major cities of Greece erupted, marking, 
to a certain degree, the end of this movement. The event that had 
triggered this revolt was the murder of Nikos Temboneras, a teacher 
who had, together with his students, defended his school’s occupation 
from the right-wing vigilantes who were trying to break it. 
In addition to the aforementioned particularities of the 1990– 103 
1991 movement, it is important to underline a number of other novel,  
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albeit minor, traits that it bore, as they have since become constant fea-
tures of the emerging political culture. Something striking about this 
movement was the difference of its slogans and banners from the pre-
vious ones. The highly-politicised slogans and demands had been re-
placed with slogans that expressed feelings, attitudes, and sometimes vi-
sionary truisms: “When injustice becomes law/resistance is [our] duty” 
or “Our dreams will be your nightmares,” etc. Also, instead of declaring 
political organisations or mere educational institutions, the banners 
declared the location of the schools and thereby linked the groups with 
their neighbourhoods, suburbs, towns, or villages. 
Moreover, in terms of the spatial allocation of the marches one 
could also notice differences: Until then the white banners of the 
student unions—usually controlled by the youth of the Communist 
Party—were at the head, followed by the red banners of the ultra left 
students, with the anarchists tailing off the march. The 1990–1991 
marches, however, had no particular order. 
Moreover, the use of political slogans and their distinctive 
rhythm, while still present, had been sexed up by rhythms and slogans 
brought in from the football pitch. Famously, the slogan “Never, never, 
never” (shouted to the opposite team to suggest that they will never 
score a goal) became a dominant one in the political movements that 
followed, suggesting that the proposed reforms which the movement 
resisted, would never be enacted. This refreshing of the slogan culture, 
joined by more upbeat demonstration “performances,” underlined a 
paradoxical return of the social to a waned political rhetoric and vo-
cabulary. The newly involved masses of school kids brought their mu-
sical preferences in as well. A typical example of this was the slogan 
suggesting that “It’s better to be the generation of chaos
8
/than in Afto-
kinisi [a hip club at the time] and dance to house [music].”  
One can argue that the movement of 1990–1991 had a rather “positive” or 
“constructive” character in comparison to the December revolt. However, 
the movement of 1990–1991 had the doubtful “privilege” of being the 
first one to act against the newly formed neoliberal regime, and was 
not yet defined by the violent conditions that neoliberalism would soon 
produce. The movement was composed of youth who, while experiencing 
the impasse of social policy and its incompe tence to fill its promises, 
stood against the neoliberal destruction of their future. They defended, 
albeit intuitively and politically incoherently, their right to the future, 
before its vision collapsed entirely, as it had 104 for the December youth 
eighteen years later. If the 1990–1991 genera-tion had something to 
defend (or loose), the December generation had 
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nothing. December’s generation was born and grew up during and after the 
introduction of neoliberalism and was formed within its context—in terms 
of both its individual and collective subjectification—a context that 
produced subjects with a generalized marginality as antagonistic 
subjectivity and of a “deregulated” political action. 
RECOMPOSITIONS CONCLUDING THE 1990s 
The 1990–1991 student unrest functioned as the model for following 
school occupation movements opposing the further attempts at neoliberal 
educational restructuring made by both conservatives and by social 
democrats. The next important moment was the 1998–1999 school oc-
cupation movement. However, before we get to 1998 we should outline a 
number of developments that followed the 1990–1991 movement. Firstly, 
there were the workers’ struggles against the deregulation of the labour 
market through deindustrialisation and privatisation. Most notably, the 
strike of the public bus drivers (the EAS strike), including its “All or 
none” (workers would stay at work) slogan and its dynamic and con-
frontational character against the state and police. However, the other 
trade unions did not actively support the strike despite the mass solidarity 
demonstrations that saw tens of thousands taking to the streets even in the 
vacation season of August. Parallel to the general disappearance of the 
official trade unions came the radicalization of the struggles of various 
sectors of workers—at least as far as forms of struggle are concerned. 
Thus, in the 1990s, there were two big farmers’ movements with road 
blockades that split the country in two for weeks; multiple monthlong 
strikes by school teachers; and a lengthy blockade of the port of Piraeus 
by dock and sea workers—to mention but a few struggles. However, these 
mobilisations remained isolated and unsynchronised with each other, 
despite having developed simultaneously at times. 
A second development is that within the atmosphere of emerg ing 
struggles in 1990–1993, the Communist Party split between those who 
wanted to stay within the SYNaspismos coalition and those wished to see 
the Party regain its autonomy. The official pretext for this divide was 
the agreement by SYNaspismos to the Maastricht Treaty. In real ity, part 
of the top cadre of the party saw opportunity in the vacuum that 
developed between the rising social discontent and the political 
formations of the 1989–1991 transitional experiment to a post-meta-
politefsi era. Thus, they aimed to fill this gap and control these new 
constituencies, seeing a renovated role as a way to cushion social ten  105 
sions before they got out of hand. So on one hand the Communist Par- 
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ty organisations were mobilized especially amongst farmers, construction 
and port workers struggles that at times tested the tolerance of the 
system’s limits; on the other hand, in the decisive moments they always 
retreated or replaced the real conflicts with symbolic ones. These sym-
bolic conflicts included mock and controlled occupations of ministries 
(executed by assigned squads of party members) or other “dynamic” 
imitations of direct action. This new configuration of reformism that 
used means of struggle that had been previously condemned as acts of 
provocation reveals once more the extent to which the “pact” of 
metapolitefsi had by that point been broken down under the pressure of the 
people’s movement. 
A third moment that ought to be recounted is the 1995 Poly-
technic occupation by the anarchist movement that followed the 17 No-
vember annual march. The fierce clashes with the police around the 
barricaded Polytechnic, the burning of Greek flags (demonstrating an 
anti-nationalist agenda), the solidarity expressed with the continuing revolt 
of the inmates of Korydalos Prison, and the besieging and eventual arrest 
of 530 young people—a large majority of whom were school students—
were all aired on live television channels. The newly-funded private TV 
channels, alongside the state-owned ERT, undertook a new role that they 
have kept up with since: to create a social consensus for the police 
offensive that aimed to silence a radical part of the youth that had been 
gaining ground since 1991. The state aimed to make an example of the 
protestors—arresting everyone who was present in the occupation—and to 
renegotiate the “academic asylum,” which prevented the police from 
entering university grounds. Nevertheless the hostage-like situation that the 
arrested and their milieu were thrown into was indeed a blow to the 
anarchist movement, though it also marked an internal transformation. It 
forced, in one respect, a part of that movement to develop different 
strategies from those of the singular scheme of policestate-banks vs. 
society, leading to a renegotiation of the tactics of violent confrontation. 
Thus a number of social centres (steki) were established at universities and 
in neighbourhoods. This relatively new anarchist activity led to the 
introduction of new people who had been politicized within the post-1995 
atmosphere, while the pre-1995 radicals gradually returned or found 
themselves in a scene that was rapidly developing. Eventually, anarchism 
in Greece made an impressive comeback during the anti-globalization 
movement’s struggles of the 2000s, and today it is considered one of the 
largest anarchist movements in Europe. 
106  What we have labelled the youth movement did not calm down  
during the 1990s. New waves of students entering high school con- 
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tinued to resist new educational reforms. Thus, in 1998, the Arsenis’s 
generation (named after the PASOK minister of education) managed to 
build the next big school occupation movement. By now, the communist 
youth had managed to reconstitute itself and supported the occupations. 
Its presence, however, only divided the schools between those that 
followed a national coordination assembly controlled by the KNE and 
those that ascribed to the independent school coordination initiative in 
which leftists and anarchist students, among others, were represented. 
Despite the dominating presence of the KNE’s coordination, the group 
was for the first time forced to adopt occupation as a means of 
struggle, though they avoided such tactics whenever they could. Still, 
they were unable to marginalise the non-KNE schools and students. The 
threat that the latter posed to the KNE, and the real attitude of the KNE 
towards them, became obvious at the beginning of the so-called Arsenis 
movement. In 1998, once more on 17 November, the riot police—with 
the active assistance of the KNE—arrested, without reason, around 160 
people who were marching with the anarchist bloc, the majority of them 
secondary school kids. 
The KNE managed over the course of the following years to 
become the first organised left force within universities—electorally 
speaking, as it is still weak in the general assemblies. It quickly returned 
to its orthodox position of condemning the occupations, but yet it fails to 
convince even its own members of this position when the issue comes 
up. During the latest student movement (2006–2007), in support of the 
constitutional Article 16 (which prevents the foundation of private uni-
versities, an article that the conservative government of ND wanted to 
change through constitutional reform), the Communist Party was ada-
mant that they did not support occupations. Similarly, and even more 
vociferously in December 2008, the KKE (Communist Party of Greece) 
received official congratulations—by the right-wing government and 
the extreme-right party LAOS—for its denunciation of violence and its 
respect for the government’s right to impose “law and order.” “In the 
revolution, not even a shopping window will be broken,” the KKE’s 
general secretary Aleka Papariga declared in December 2008 in the 
Greek parliament.
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As previously mentioned, more radical forms of action have been 
established as the norm throughout the last two decades. A typical example 
of this was the so-called ASEP strike of 1997–1998. ASEP was the name 
of a new state organization that used written exams to determine a 
teacher’s right to work. ASEP was pushing hiring practices 107 
towards a market-oriented evaluation process that would replace the 
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previous system of placement based on teaching experience and academic 
merit. After numerous strikes, the movement decided to physically prevent 
the new exams from being administered. This meant three days of 
occupations of the exam centres and it meant clashes with the police. The 
fight was lost, but the movement, despite its organisational 
shortcomings, raised the stakes to an unprecedented level. It was one of 
the few cases in which a formal trade union decided to make use of direct 
action, which shows how particular dynamic practices had become 
legitimised forms of action. 
2000s: TOWARDS THE UNEXPECTED 
The Greek far left and anarchist movements participated actively in the 
various anti-globalization gatherings that followed Seattle during the late 
1990s and early 2000s, most notably in Prague (2000) and Genoa (2001), 
which several thousand activists from Greece travelled to and participated 
in. The same model was repeated in December 2001 in Brussels and it was 
followed by an anti-EU demonstration in the Greek city of Thessaloniki in 
the summer of 2003. This international experience gave the chance for the 
Greek movement to put some of their tactics into a new perspective, to 
compare and to solidify them in order to project them within an 
international framework. New international points of reference were added 
to the logic of the Greek movement and new codes emerged. At the same 
time, this globalization of the movement has to be seen in parallel with the 
changes that globalization brought to Greek society itself. A typical 
example is that of an increasing number of youth migrating for studies and 
thus increasing the international links between the youth of Greece and the 
rest of Europe. Moreover, this was happening as a drastic inflow of 
immigration was taking place in Greece at the same time, particularly 
since the early 1990s. Migrants’ rights and solidarity were added to the 
agenda of the movement while a lot of migrants—particularly second-
generation—started participating in secondary school and university 
movements. 
It was during the 2000s when, for the first time, a sizeable group of 
people emerged into the terrain of social and political struggles on such 
numerous fronts as local issues regarding environment and free urban 
spaces, official or grassroots union struggles, anti-racism, anti-war, anti-
imperialism, and international solidarity campaigns, etc. This so-called 
“social left” identified with some of the objectives and strategies 108 of 
political groupings (from radical left to anarchist ones) but did not wish to 
become explicitly part of them, although many hold anti-hier- 
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archical or/and anti-authoritarian views. This part of society became visible 
quite suddenly in May 2005 when, at the closing demonstration of the 
European Social Forum of Athens, more than 70,000 people participated. 
The sudden appearance of this part of society and in such great numbers 
not only surprised everyone, but it catalysed the kick-off of the “Defend 
Article 16” movement. 
This university-centred movement took place in 2006 and 2007. 
It was a year-and-a-half-long campaign against the aforementioned 
change of the constitution’s Article 16, which secures a free and public 
higher education. The movement represented an important moment 
because it showed an attempt of political subjects, especially on the side 
of the radical left within the education movement, to correspond to and 
mould themselves to social shifts and aspirations in a militant 
movement. The broadness of this movement was a successful—though a 
weak and contingent—meeting of the political subject and social 
discontent. Of course, it is not coincidence that this occurred in the 
realm of the education sector in which a long tradition of mobilisations 
had established patterns of cooperation between different parts of the 
movement. It was this wide inclusion and unity of focus that made this 
movement successful in the end and even enabled it to revitalise hope 
for the potential of the intervention of the radical left in the central 
political scene. This was also supported by the unification of different 
tendencies within the left that could not have been previously imagined. 
These two last statements refer particularly to the project of SYRIZA 
(Coalition of Radical Left).
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However, when these ruptures became an eruption in December 
2008, the social movements and the people more actively involved met 
with their limitations and had to deal with events that, while they may 
have contributed to, were beyond their reach. The role of this radical 
social left in building new sites for the antagonistic movement, and in 
acting as a national network of activists distributing a different political 
culture, must not be neglected in the effort to discern new shifts in the 
formation of social antagonism in Greece. Not in the least because it 
manifests the changing relations between social agency and political 
organization, even within the left. 
A second development, closely paralleling the first, was the ex -
pansion of and further integration of the anarchist/anti-authoritarian 
movement over the past few years. In other words, anarchist groups, 
organizations, media, publications, and activities started appearing in 
more cities and towns than they ever had been before. Simultaneously, 109 
anarchist groups started getting more involved with wider social issues 
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such as labour relationships or neighbourhood demands, and for first 
time during this period we have a much wider dissemination and popu-
larization of anarchist ideas within society. One must recognise the role of 
new media and technology (particularly Athens Indymedia) in both acting 
as a “centre” (not exclusively, but primarily) for the anarchist/an-
tiauthoritarian movement while at the same time multiplying its decen-
tralisation and creation of its experience and practices (e.g. social centres). 
It is obvious that this spread of the movement and the increasing fluidity of 
the terrain of various local or national-scale struggles diversified the 
anarchist movement even more and created a whole group of activists 
that refuse any fixed ideological position. This shift manifested in the 
participation of “anarchists/anti-authoritarians/autonomists” in the 
movement for Article 16, in contrast with their previously hostile attitude 
towards the student movements. As such, the 2006–07 movement 
provided more than just the confidence inspired by its victory, but also a 
fresh memory and organising experience for the generation that revolted a 
year later. 
POST-DECEMBER ’08: “MOVING BY ASKING” 
This text began with the story of a teacher and her son. Although the two 
of them had different demographic cohorts, they both seem to have 
experienced moments of political ruptures during their school years. 
Then we described some moments in the political genealogy of revolts in 
post-dictatorial Greece and the emergence and development of the 
practices and discourses that could be seen during December 2008. 
December, although it surprised everyone, did not come out of the blue. 
Although social injustice and social rage had been accumulating at the 
time, the event bore with it a legacy; a legacy not in terms of direct 
physical links—although these too were part of December 2008, as older 
activists who had not been on the streets for years ended up in the 
demonstrations, at the barricades, and in the occupations—but in terms 
of semiology, practices, discourses, and imagination. In other words, 
December 2008 was an intensive materialization of previously 
constructed images and experiences. 
Moreover, in this chapter we have tried to demonstrate that, although the 
post–dictatorial political ruptures have often been portrayed and 
perceived in continuity with previous movements, they actually also 
carry some distinct qualities. First of all, they took place in what  was 110 
formally the longest-lasting democratic period in modern Greek his-tory 
and at the same time reflect the neoliberal restructuring that has  
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affected every sector of Greek society since 1989–90. The frequency of 
these mass movements and the rebellion of students and young adults that 
occurred in the last twenty-five or so years also released a social 
dynamic that at the same time reflected and propelled such shifts on 
many levels. Most importantly, the emerging political subjectivities of the 
neoliberal era of Greece challenged the political structures that cor-
responded to the pre-neoliberal conditions as they had been formed after 
the collapse of the dictatorship. 
The December 2008 events constituted the full disintegration of 
such political superstructures, following the complete removal (thanks 
to neoliberal restructuring) of the social grounds over which they stood, 
resulting in their violent collapse. However, in the eruption of 
December 2008 and during the previous ruptures, this depositioning of 
the social in relation to its political abstraction (representation and 
state) was not articulated into a coherent social alternative. It was ar-
ticulated as a violent, non-directional (or rather multi-directional) “re-
alignment” of the political with the social terrains of the dismantled 
previous structures, forced into being by “the street.” It is in this sense 
that those who revolted in December completed the work of previous 
moments of social antagonism that had challenged the “limits of pro -
test” that the democratically-elected regimes had imposed. Those pre-
vious moments had caused several cracks in the political establishment 
of the post-dictatorship state that led to the eruption. December also 
signifies one of the first revolts within the latest global economic 
crisis, marking in one sense the end of the neoliberal hegemony by 
exposing its remnants. 
Throughout the post-dictatorial period, and especially over the 
course of the last twenty years, movements in Greece had been building 
towards an end that December 2008 materialised and fulfilled. But as 
we know, there is no end that is not also a beginning—the only question is 
of what sort. What kind of political logic, agency, field, and discourse 
has December 2008 produced? To confine this only to the participants 
of December 2008 would be an act of evasion. It would be evasive to not 
try to understand, face, and deal with the results of that great unmaking, 
of what the December 2008 revolt produced by penetrating all levels of 
the Greek society, not only those who participated in it. Failing to frame 
the action within the larger shifts in the post-December 2008 picture 
would be an attempt to avoid the questions that December 2008 has 
raised, questions that we need to face if we really want to turn the 
momentary grasp of the impossible, that we all felt, into a real 111 
potential. That, however, is another article. What we address herein are  
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the discernible changes that December 2008 has produced as (part of) its 
legacy, both in the still-active social subject that was formulated by 
experiencing (or, rather, making) it and in the larger political culture within 
the antagonist movement. 
Occupations and violent confrontation as dominant forms of 
political activism drew a formal line between revolutionary practices and 
reformist ones. However, we argue here that the gradual demar-
ginalisation of these tactics, as part of consecutive political and social 
struggles, met its own end in December 2008. In one sense the “absolute” 
domination or exercise of these tactics meant also their end as political 
indexes of radicalism (if they ever were as such by themselves). 
December 2008 challenged their limits and, by trespassing the borders of 
the most radical or maximal forms of political action, laid bare the 
nakedness of the political discourses and identities that had been build 
around their formality. This was something that was unfortunately re-
alised with tragic consequences a year and a half later on 5 May 2010. 
On that day, three bank workers died in a fire set, allegedly, by “black 
bloc” activists, during an anti-IMF general strike. 
At the same time, the December 2008 revolt reproduced such 
forms at their highest fidelity, realising them as simulacra. Thus the 
“non-result” of December 2008—which far from being non-productive, 
produced something that was and is of a different order—revealed not 
the inadequacy of such forms of action necessarily, but the political 
vacuum beneath or behind them, in that they were not supported by, nor 
did they support, an alternative way of doing or imagining things. That 
suggests that the December 2008 revolt was rather the expression of a 
social implosion rather than of a social explosion. It is within this 
context of implosion that one can detect the December 2008 revolt both 
as disruption and as a missed opportunity. Or as a slogan on a wall in 
Athens during those days put it: “December was not an answer. It was a 
question.” 
One could argue that any attempt to return to the pre-December 2008 
political normalities is impossible at any level and for any actor in Greek 
political life. What followed the December revolt was a culmination in 
the intensification of the Greek crisis,
11
 the neo-colonial regime of the 
IMF-EU imposed rule, and the unmaking of metapolitefsi from the top 
down through the forced collapse of any social and public regulations, the 
development of a securitised state, and the popular resistance to it. Even 
if the resistance is inefficient and lacking 112 when compared to the size 
of both the attack and the social anger, the threat of a new eruption is still 
a visible phantom over Greece. It is not 
9 This congratulation of the KKE was repeated by the current minister of education 
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only the social anger that boils. Since the post-December struggles a new 
militant subject is emerging, one whose political culture cross-cuts the 
existing radical and revolutionary political actors and changes their 
qualities. There are developments that, in any case, have accelerated and 
condensed socio-historical time so much that they have made incomplete 
any critical discourse on December 2008 that doesn’t project it in the 
context of more recent events. Having said that, one should be equally 
cautious not to underestimate the similarly incomplete, but real, social 
potential that the revolt opened up, a potential that still burns and re-
shapes both the political culture at large and the antagonistic movement 
in Greece. 
NOTES 
1 For a typical example of such a position one can see in The New York Times a text by a 
Greek professor at Yale named Stathis Kalyvas, under the title “Why Athens is Burning,” 
published during the December revolt. See: http://www.nytimes. 
com/2008/12/11/opinion/11iht-edkalyvas.1.18595110.html 
2 The ban had been in place since 1976 and respected by the institutional left (PASOK, 
KKE, and KKE), until November 1981 when, under PASOK, the ban was lifted. It is 
still a contested of the US embassy each year. The US embassy is the destination of the 
annual 17 November demonstration because the US government backed the Greek 
junta. 
3 It is important not to forget that this is also the era of the “farewell to the working 
class” among the disillusioned social democrats, leftists, and anarchists, the era of 
alternative social movements, and the era of the ascendancy of the neoliberal agenda 
and culture as expressed by the yuppies. This is not a minor point: the processes of pre-
neoliberal politics and the emergence of neoliberalism as political structures/field have 
defined, to a certain extent, the production of its negation and its opposing social 
subject. 
4 Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the extreme-right National Front party in France. 
5 The Greek equivalent of the Italian “operation clean hands” that changed drastically the 
map of Italian politics to date. However, in Greece, it was merely a caricature as the two-
party system of corruption and carried on. 
7 A few months earlier, the majority of KNE had been kicked out of the Party because they 
disagreed with the collaboration between the Party with the right-wing ND. 
8 Generation of Chaos (Genia tou chaous) was the name of an anarchist punk rock band of 
the 1980s. 
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in October 2010. When a new school occupation movement began, with the potential to 
put the IMF-subdued social democratic government in a difficult position prior to the 
start of elections, the KKE was quick to separate itself and to condemn those kinds of  
actions. 
10 This was particularly obvious in the case of SYRIZA, a left coalition party with 
parliamentary presence. SYRIZA was the only parliamentary party that explicitly 
expressed its solidarity with December’s revolt. Moreover, parts of SYRIZA had a 
visible and active participation in December. SYRIZA increased its electoral strength 
during the 2006–2007 students’ movement. However, the full project is now falling 
apart, as some parts of the coalition have broken away from it. 
11 We consider “the Greek crisis” to be something that is not merely an economic, but is 
instead an organic systemic crisis, and we see and the December 2008 revolt as its first 
grand moment. December 2008 was the first instance of an implosion of the system, rather 
than a social explosion due to its internal socio-economic contradictions (on the 
international level) and the specific socio-political discrepancies (on the national level) that 
together formed the current crisis in Greece. 
